Former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's fall from grace
appears to widen the gap between a hard-line elite and the rest of the
country. Iran expert Ali Ansari explores what might emerge from the 2013
poll.
FULL STORY
Has Iranian regime learned nothing from 2009 election fiasco?
May 27, 2013 -- Updated 1533 GMT (2333 HKT)
STORY HIGHLIGHTS
- Iranian regime is keen to encourage the public to put the past behind them, Ali Ansari writes
- He points out the consolidation of power around Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
- Ansari: Khamenei has been able to blame divisions on Ahmadinejad and his "deviant current"
Editor's note: Professor Ali Ansari is director of the Institute for Iranian Studies at the University of St. Andrews.
(CNN) -- Former President Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani's abrupt fall from grace has taken many in political circles
in Iran by surprise, further widening the gap between an increasingly
insular and narrow hard-line elite and the rest of the country.
It reinforces a trend
towards the consolidation of power around Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei and his acolytes, which has been taking place for the better
part of a decade, and perhaps the real surprise is the fact is that
there remain members of the elite who did not think this remorseless
process would ultimately apply to them.
Ever since the political
catastrophe of 2009, when millions pored onto the streets to protest
what was widely considered to be a highly fraudulent election process,
the regime has been keen to encourage the public to put the past behind
them and to look forward to these elections as a cathartic exercise
during which political blemishes could be washed away.
Ali Ansari
Rafsanjani's dramatic last-minute entrance into the race, was seen by many as proof that some lessons had indeed been learnt.
But if Rafsanjani was to galvanize the public, then his platform had to be radical and his boast that he had
come to "save the nation" and effectively "reboot" the Islamic Republic, was certainly bold.
However, the fact that he
claimed that he had to ask permission to run, was indicative of how far
the political realities of Iran had changed since he had last been
president (1989-1997).
No sooner had he
registered than the bitter personal attacks came from the hard-liners;
while others questioned just what the nature of the agreement with
Khamenei had been, if any.
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But perhaps most galling was that for all the hype and excitement generated by his supporters, the public appeared unmoved.
Popular momentum might
have developed, though the task would have been considerably harder than
2009 given the absence of a political infrastructure of street
activists, (largely dismantled since 2009), and above all the sheer
cynicism of the voting public.
Public apathy combined
with the conceit of the new ruling class, to deliver a particularly
brutal humiliation to Rafsanjani, barred apparently not for his
political views, but for the rather less dignified reason that the
members of the Guardian Council thought Rafsanjani too old to be able to bear the burden of office.
Rafsanjani's dramatic
entrance and precipitous fall has shone a light on the growing fractures
within elite politics in Iran. To date Khamenei has been able to blame
divisions on Ahmadinejad and his "deviant current" on the one hand, and
the foreign inspired sedition of Mir-Hussein Musavi and Mehdi Karrubi
(still under house arrest) on the other.
Few expected
Ahmadinejad's protégé, Esfandyar Rahim Mashaie, to survive the vetting
process -- other that is, than Ahmadinejad, for whom being on the
"outside" must be an uncomfortable experience.
Similarly, if slightly
more realistically, few of Rafsanjani's supporters considered him
vulnerable. He remained after all a pillar of the establishment, even if
two of his children had been hounded into jail and he had effectively
been ostracized over the past four years for his tentative support of
the Green Movement.
It says much of the "wishful thinking" that remains prevalent, that they thought this a political virtue.
Firm in the belief that
the Islamic Republic faced an existential threat, they had retained
their faith in the integrity of a system that has long since transformed
beyond recognition into a sacred autocracy.
Indeed the
unpredictability of the Iranian political system is not a reflection of
its inherent 'democracy', but of the absence of the rule of law and the
growing identification of power in the person of Khamenei.
Both the Guardian
Council's "rulings" (which it should be stressed are neither published
nor explained) and the fact they can be overturned on the whims of the
Supreme Leader, are indicative of this harsh reality.
What we are left with is
a tightly controlled "election" with a dry and uninteresting field. Of
the eight ratified candidates, one is a nonentity, (Mohammad Gharazi);
two are ostensible "moderates" lacking in charisma and therefore
non-threatening, (Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Reza Aref); one is an
independent Principle-ist (Mohsen Rezaei) who likes to speak his mind
but on past performance is unlikely to garner votes (real or imagined);
while the remaining four are self proclaimed acolytes of the Leader.
Of these four, two have
been highlighted as the probable annointees: Saeed Jalili, the current
head of the National Security Council, and Mohammad Ghalibaf, the mayor
of Tehran.
Jalili is widely assumed
to be the favorite and his web presence is suitably polished and
indicative of considerable preparation, though quite who the audience
for this is, given the current restrictions on internet access in the
run-up to the election, remains unclear.
Jalili is perhaps
closest ideologically to the Supreme Leader. For this particular
puritan, the crisis Iran faces is not existential, it is an opportunity
to be seized and a trial to be welcomed.
Ghalibaf, who once
fancied himself as Iran's answer to Tom Cruise, has had his popular
credibility bruised by the sudden release of a recording of a speech he
allegedly gave to members of the Basij militia bragging about how much
he enjoyed getting on his motorbike and thumping students.
Ghalibaf has vigorously
dismissed the recording as a malicious smear, but it says much about
current politics that there are many who find it credible.
The real question of
course is the source of the leak; and herein perhaps lies the real
significance of recent developments. In 2009, the regime lost the
people; it now appears to be in the process of divesting itself of its
traditional elite. How the newly disenfranchised react will be
interesting to watch. This may be the real legacy of the "election" of
2013.
The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of Ali Ansari.
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