Some previous U.S. military ops in Africa added to long-term instability
and raised questions about their legality. Will the weekend's
counter-terror raids be more successful?
FULL STORY
Navy SEALs raid Somali town
U.S. forces make 2 raids in Africa
2012: Who are Boko Haram?
Has U.S. learned from past counter-terrorism mistakes in Africa?
October 7, 2013 -- Updated 1426 GMT (2226 HKT)
(File) Boko Haram in Nigeria is very different from Al-Shabaab, which is different from AQIM, Alex Vines writes.
STORY HIGHLIGHTS
- Counter-terrorism policies live on the edge of international law, Alex Vines writes
- U.S. raids in Africa show that America's military is increasingly active on the continent
- Building up professional, accountable militaries is only part of the solution, Vines says
Editor's note: Alex Vines is director of Area Studies and International Law at London-based think tank Chatham House.
(CNN) -- U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's claim that terrorists "can run but they can't hide"
following two operations in Africa over the weekend is a reminder that
America's military is increasingly active on the continent.
It also raises questions
about the international legality of such operations, and their long-term
impact, especially in weak African states. In some cases U.S. military
engagements in Africa have already caused further instability rather
than reducing the risks for international peace and security?
The U.S. Army's Delta force seizure of alleged al Qaeda leader Abu Anas al Libi,
who was born Nazih Abd al Hamid al Ruqhay, in Libya is significant for
U.S. counter-terrorism efforts. A few months ago, President Barack Obama
and former President George W. Bush attended a memorial service in Dar
es Salaam on the anniversary of the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania that killed more than 220 people.
Alex Vines
Al-Libi was allegedly the mastermind behind these bombings and has been one of the U.S.'s wanted men for the last 15 years.
A second U.S. military operation by Navy Seals in Somalia was aimed at capturing Islamist militant leader said to be Mukhtar Abu Zubayr,
who also goes by Ahmed Abdi Godane, the leader of Al-Shabaab, the group
that claimed responsibility for last month's attack on the Westgate
shopping mall in Kenya. The operation was aborted under heavy armed fire
during their amphibious assault.
Navy SEALs raid Somali town
U.S. forces make 2 raids in Africa
2012: Who are Boko Haram?
The Somalia operation is a
reminder of how technically difficult such operations are and how
accurate U.S. intelligence needs to be. Such operations though fit into a
bigger picture of U.S. and Western counter-terrorism strategy in
Africa, and how these poorly governed, fragile states provide havens and
laboratories for terrorism franchises.
Listening to the
difficulties that the U.S. Navy Seals encountered in Somalia, reminded
me that October 3, marked 20 years since 18 U.S. soldiers and hundreds
of Somalis died in a battle that saw two Black Hawk helicopters shot down over Mogadishu. This was seen at the time as one of the worst disasters in American military history.
The result in 1993 was
that U.S. and international community left Somalia to its own fate --
which over two decades has brought it back into the front-line of
international counter-terrorism efforts.
While the outcome in
1993 was disengagement, U.S. engagement policy under President George W.
Bush in Somalia to remove the Islamic Courts Union in late 2006
resulted in deepened radicalization and the rise of Al-Shabaab.
Similarly Western policy
toward Libya in 2011, interpreting a narrow civilian protection U.N.
mandate for pushing for regime change resulted in the instability of
Libya today, and the knock-on effects in the Sahel, including the
radical Islamists capturing northern Mali until a French intervention
loosened their hold on power earlier in 2013.
Counter-terrorism
policies live on the edge of international law: extrajudicial killings
by drones or proxy hit squads are clearly contentious and extraordinary
renditions -- suspect-grabbing operations -- are unlawful. Known
extraordinary renditions in Africa have occurred in many African
countries, including Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gambia,
Kenya, Libya, Malawi, Morocco, Mauritania, Tanzania, Somalia, South
Africa and Zimbabwe. The Obama administration has not publically stated
if such operations continue.
Today the U.S. military
brief congress with maps showing an arc of instability by Islamist
terrorists from Somalia and the Gulf of Aden across the Sahel and Sahara
to the Atlantic Ocean and Mauritania.
The mistake would be to regard this as a homogeneous threat. Boko Haram in Nigeria is very different from Al-Shabaab, which is different from AQIM.
What is similar is that
all these groups thrive in weakened and poorly governed states but the
solutions are much more costly and long term: institution building, good
governance and job creation.
Building up professional
and accountable African militaries is only part of the solution and
Western efforts in Somalia in support of the continental body the
African Union have had success in combatting Al-Shabaab and
significantly weakening them, despite the Westgate attack in Kenya.
It is though also
pursuing policies that do not cause greater harm and radicalize further,
as U.S. strategy toward Somalia in 2006 did and arguably US, French and
British policy did toward Libya in 2011. If we are to advocate good
governance, and rule of law as the ultimate remedies, we should more
assiduously find ways of ensuring our policies are values-led, rather
than by interests.
Not forgetting the
lessons learned from Somalia and Libya about the unintended consequences
of non-intervention and intervention is important if international
efforts to counter terrorism in Africa in the long term are to be
successful.COPY http://edition.cnn.com/
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