The scale of Vladimir Putin's ambition was revealed when he referred to
part of Ukraine as "New Russia," writes analyst David Clark.
FULL STORY
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WHO IS WINNING?
Pro-Russian activists storm an
administration building in the center of Luhansk, Ukraine, on Tuesday,
April 29. Ukraine has seen a sharp rise in tensions since a new
pro-European government took charge of the country in February.
New round of sanctions on Russia
Observers detained in eastern Ukraine
'Chaotic' situation unfolding in Ukraine
Ukraine crisis hurting Russia's economy
Putin's fighters, missiles, warships
Russia: U.S. running the show in Ukraine
Opinion: Putin's empire building is not a new Cold War
April 29, 2014 -- Updated 1105 GMT (1905 HKT)
Pro-Russian activists storm an
administration building in the center of Luhansk, Ukraine, on Tuesday,
April 29. Ukraine has seen a sharp rise in tensions since a new
pro-European government took charge of the country in February.
HIDE CAPTION
Crisis in Ukraine
STORY HIGHLIGHTS
- The scale of Russian President Putin's imperial ambitions revealed, David Clark says
- But events in Ukraine have left the West uncertain about how to respond, he writes
- There are an arc of countries with good reason to be concerned about Russian policy
- Policy of containment must be used to block the illegitimate exercise of power
Editor's note: David Clark is chair of the Russia Foundation,
which is a UK-based think-tank focused on education and dialogue on
themes including democracy and economic cooperation. Clark was a special
adviser to former foreign secretary Robin Cook between 1997 and 2001.
Follow Clark on Twitter. The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely his.
London (CNN) -- The full scale of Russian President
Vladimir Putin's new imperial ambition was revealed recently when he
referred to the southern and eastern territories of Ukraine as
Novorossiya (New Russia).
This was the name given
to the region by Catherine the Great after she captured it from the
Ottomans in the late 18th century and began colonizing it with Russian,
Ukrainian and German settlers.
Along with his assertion
that Crimea belongs to Russia because of the blood-price Russian troops
paid to conquer it more than two centuries ago, Putin's appropriation of
Tsarist terminology establishes a new and troubling benchmark for his
irredentist project.
David Clark
It suggests that all the territories that were once part of the Russian Empire are now fair game.
This concerns far more
than the fate of Ukraine. Pushed to its logical conclusion, it poses a
direct challenge to the legitimacy and independence of all post-Soviet
states.
The practice of
manipulating "frozen conflicts" and deploying Russian troops as
"peacekeepers" in order to exert leverage is already well established in
Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan, and there is an extensive toolbox of
other coercive measures Moscow is willing to apply, from trade embargoes
to cyber attacks.
While the scope of
Russian territorial expansion is likely to be limited and the threat of
military force mostly held in reserve, the ambition to subordinate the
wider region under the aegis of the emerging Eurasian Union is
absolutely clear. Welcome to the new Russian Empire.
Putin's appropriation of Tsarist terminology establishes a new and troubling benchmark for his irredentist project
David Clark
David Clark
Events in Ukraine have left the West uncertain about how to respond. For all the talk of a new Cold War,
there is one important difference with the past that helps to explain
why. Whereas Soviet communism defined its ideological purpose in terms
of universal goals that posed a threat to the West, Putin emphasizes the
exceptional character of Russian civilization and limits his vision to
the domination of Eurasia.
His challenge is not of
the existential variety that once forced Western governments to set
aside their differences in the face of a common enemy.
It belongs instead to
the realm of values where the post-Cold War ideal of a "Europe whole and
free" clashes with Putin's determination to build an exclusive sphere
of influence in the east.
It's much harder to
mobilize countries in defense of abstract principles rather than their
own physical security, but that is what the West must do if it wants to
prevent the unraveling of a European order based on democratic values.
While some lessons of the Cold War will be relevant, others will not.
New round of sanctions on Russia
One idea that deserves
qualified approval is containment, once more being talked about as the
basis for U.S. policy towards Russia. This was the strategy adopted by
the Truman administration at the onset of the Cold War, designed to
block Soviet expansionism through a variety of military, economic and
diplomatic countermeasures.
Observers detained in eastern Ukraine
The pledge Harry Truman
gave to "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by
armed minorities or outside pressures" is certainly relevant at a time
when Russian troops are assembling on Ukraine's borders and their
proxies are orchestrating violence inside the country.
'Chaotic' situation unfolding in Ukraine
There is now an arc of
countries stretching from the Gulf of Finland to the borders of China
with good reason to be concerned about the direction of Russian policy.
Many of them have large Russian minorities of their own. The West needs a
comprehensive strategy for engaging with all of them.
The states at risk fall into three distinct categories.
The first is comprised
of countries like Poland and the Baltic States that already enjoy the
institutional security of belonging to NATO and the EU. The task here is
to reinforce deterrence capabilities in order to prevent
miscalculations on the part of Russia.
It's much harder to mobilize countries in defense of abstract principles rather than their own physical security
David Clark
David Clark
The second group, and
probably the most significant, consists of vulnerable pro-Western
countries, including Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine itself,
all of which now have Russian troops directly or indirectly involved in
conflicts on their territory.
Azerbaijan is
particularly important as a strategic partner in helping to diversify
Europe's energy supplies. The opening of the southern gas corridor with
the addition of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline will provide substantial
quantities of Azeri gas by 2019, thus weakening Russia's grip on the
European market.
All of these states are
linked to Western institutions through the EU's European Neighbourhood
Policy and NATO's Partnership for Peace program.
These need to be
upgraded as a matter of priority, especially since full membership is
not an immediate prospect. Objectives should include deeper trade ties,
structured political consultations and help in modernizing and
strengthening their defensive capabilities.
Ukraine crisis hurting Russia's economy
Ultimately, Western
countries must be willing to extend explicit security guarantees,
preferably within the NATO framework, but outside it if necessary.
Putin's fighters, missiles, warships
Engagement with the
third group of countries -- authoritarian post-Soviet states including
Belarus, Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian republics -- may seem
like a waste of time given the support some of them gave Moscow after
the seizure of Crimea.
Russia: U.S. running the show in Ukraine
But much of this support
will have been offered out of fear rather than genuine approval. Just
as Cold War containment involved engagement with communist countries,
such as China and Yugoslavia, willing to depart from the Moscow line,
its modern counterpart should aim to disrupt Putin's coercive alliance
building strategy at every opportunity.
There is, however, one
important sense in which neo-containment should differ from its Cold War
predecessor. Although its architect, George Kennan, always hoped that
it would be used to modify Soviet behavior, containment in practice
became part of a zero-sum struggle in which there could only be one
survivor.
The aim of containment
today should not be to engineer Russia's collapse, but to block the
illegitimate exercise of power and encourage Russian leaders to pursue
their interests by respecting the sovereign equality of their neighbors.
In the long-term, Russia would be stronger not weaker as a result.
The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of David Clark.
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