Op-Ed Contributor: Repairing Trust Among Allies
Op-Ed Contributor
Repairing Trust Among Allies
By WOLFGANG ISCHINGER
Published: November 1, 2013
Berlin — In the wake of revelations that the United States government
tapped the cellphone of Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel,
trans-Atlantic relations have reached a low point not seen since the
Iraq war.
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Listening Post: One Casualty of Eavesdropping on Merkel: A Warm Rapport (November 1, 2013)
In fact, the current crisis may be worse: Back then it was a question of
policy disagreement; this time, it is a matter of broken trust and
personal humiliation, the worst thing that can happen to a political
leader.
For Germans, it is particularly painful. We remember well the days of
the Cold War, when East Germans like Ms. Merkel were spied on by the
Stasi. Again, in some ways this is worse: The Stasi wasn’t our friend;
America is.
In International Diplomacy 101, one learns that the most important
ingredient of international cooperation is trust, easy to lose but hard
to gain. How can Ms. Merkel, or anyone else in the European political
leadership, ever trust the White House again?
The problem is not that countries spy on one another per se. Everybody
does it (well, many countries do it) with varying degrees of
effectiveness and success. But few governments do it to the extent that
the Americans appear to have done — the tap on Ms. Merkel’s phone began
in 2002, long before she became chancellor, and apparently was not even
terminated after she was awarded the Medal of Freedom in the Rose Garden
a few years ago.
Nor can we deny that fighting terrorism requires huge expenditures and
unusual measures. But asserting that only adds insult to injury: Ms.
Merkel, the French president, François Hollande, and other allied
leaders are surely not among Washington’s terror suspects.
Rather, the heart of the scandal is bad management and hubris. Normally,
when a spy proposes to expose a corrupt foreign leader, or to install a
listening device in a foreign capital, his political-risk manager will
assess whether the potential damage from exposure outweighs the
intelligence benefits.
Apparently, this kind of risk assessment either did not exist or was
ignored when the decision to eavesdrop on Chancellor Merkel and others
was made. Given the size and power of the United States intelligence
apparatus, and the eagerness with which it has been deployed, this lack
of oversight is truly frightening.
In a personal relationship, the destruction of trust would likely lead
one or both parties to end the bond completely. But among countries,
particularly ones as mutually dependent as European nations and the
United States, such severance is out of the question. The important
question now is how to proceed with rebuilding that trust, while taking
care not to irrevocably damage the trans-Atlantic relationship.
For one thing, President Obama must find a way to show contrition. Many
in Europe understand that it would be tricky for him to issue an apology
since this could weaken him and his intelligence agencies. Yet doing so
could go a long way in placating irate Europeans.
Besides, if the rift over Iraq has taught us anything, it is that
dealing with the continuing dynamics of a developing crisis is just as
important as the disagreement itself. Let us not repeat the mistakes of
2003, when both sides did not do nearly enough to prevent the crisis
from spiraling almost out of control.
Second, while Europeans may understandably desire some sort of payback,
they should not deepen the rift by linking the scandal to the continuing
negotiations to form the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership, as some angry commentators have called for. The partnership
is as much in European interests as it is in American interests, and it
will be an important means for rebuilding ties once the scandal has
passed.
Third, the United States should take the initiative in developing
confidence-building measures. One important step could be a
trans-Atlantic “no- spy” agreement on standards for surveillance and
intelligence operations among allies. This would build on a report,
adopted by the European Parliament in 2001, which called for “a common
level of protection against intelligence operations based on the highest
level of protection which exists in any Member State” and declared that
a “similar code of conduct” should be negotiated with the United
States. Then 9/11 happened.
Finally, European political leaders are not the only ones who believe
that the American intelligence community has gone too far; important
voices in the United States Congress agree. Discussions between
congressional intelligence committees and their European counterparts
could help manage and resolve this crisis. In a related fashion,
America’s Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board might also be a
potential partner for Europe in taking these issues forward in a
bipartisan way.
One step that should be avoided is a proposal, currently making the
rounds, to limit the number of accredited American diplomats in any one
country to the reciprocal number of that country’s diplomats in the
United States — an age-old diplomatic principle that Europeans, mindful
of America’s size and interests, have traditionally not had a desire to
invoke.
Such steps might offer momentary satisfaction, and would certainly seem
to limit the reach of American intelligence. But because they would be
premised on a relationship of mistrust, they would not help repair
trans-Atlantic relations. As tempting as it might be, the Europeans
should resist the urge to play tit-for-tat. If both sides make damage
limitation their priority, then over time a sense of trust can re-emerge
across the Atlantic.
Wolfgang Ischinger, the president of the Munich Security Conference, was the German ambassador to the United States from 2001 to 2006. copy http://international.nytimes.com/
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