Annals of Diplomacy
Trump, Putin, and the New Cold War
By Evan Osnos, David Remnick, and Joshua Yaffa
What
lay behind Russia’s interference in the 2016 election—and what
lies ahead?
ANNALS
OF DIPLOMACY
MARCH
6, 2017 ISSUE
TRUMP, PUTIN, AND THE NEW COLD WAR
What lay behind Russia’s interference in the 2016 election—and what lies ahead?
By Evan Osnos, David Remnick, and Joshua Yaffa
The
D.N.C. hacks, many analysts believe, were just a skirmish in a larger
war against Western institutions and alliances.ILLUSTRATION BY
CHRISTOPH NIEMANN
1. SOFT TARGETS
On
April 12, 1982, Yuri Andropov, the chairman of the K.G.B., ordered
foreign-intelligence operatives to carry out “active
measures”—aktivniye meropriyatiya—against the
reëlection campaign of President Ronald Reagan. Unlike classic
espionage, which involves the collection of foreign secrets, active
measures aim at influencing events—at undermining a rival power
with forgeries, front groups, and countless other techniques honed
during the Cold War. The Soviet leadership considered Reagan an
implacable militarist. According to extensive notes made by Vasili
Mitrokhin, a high-ranking K.G.B. officer and archivist who later
defected to Great Britain, Soviet intelligence tried to infiltrate
the headquarters of the Republican and Democratic National
Committees, popularize the slogan “Reagan Means War!,” and
discredit the President as a corrupt servant of the
military-industrial complex. The effort had no evident effect. Reagan
won forty-nine of fifty states.
Active
measures were used by both sides throughout the Cold War. In the
nineteen-sixties, Soviet intelligence officers spread a rumor that
the U.S. government was involved in the assassination of Martin
Luther King, Jr. In the eighties, they spread the rumor that American
intelligence had “created” the aids virus,
at Fort Detrick, Maryland. They regularly lent support to leftist
parties and insurgencies. The C.I.A., for its part, worked to
overthrow regimes in Iran, Cuba, Haiti, Brazil, Chile, and Panama. It
used cash payments, propaganda, and sometimes violent measures to
sway elections away from leftist parties in Italy, Guatemala,
Indonesia, South Vietnam, and Nicaragua. After the collapse of the
Soviet Union, in the early nineties, the C.I.A. asked Russia to
abandon active measures to spread disinformation that could harm the
U.S. Russia promised to do so. But when Sergey Tretyakov, the station
chief for Russian intelligence in New York, defected, in 2000, he
revealed that Moscow’s active measures had never subsided. “Nothing
has changed,” he wrote, in 2008. “Russia is doing everything it
can today to embarrass the U.S.”
Vladimir
Putin, who is quick to accuse the West of hypocrisy, frequently
points to this history. He sees a straight line from the West’s
support of the anti-Moscow “color revolutions,” in Georgia,
Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine, which deposed corrupt, Soviet-era leaders,
to its endorsement of the uprisings of the Arab Spring. Five years
ago, he blamed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for the
anti-Kremlin protests in Moscow’s Bolotnaya Square. “She set the
tone for some of our actors in the country and gave the signal,”
Putin said. “They heard this and, with the support of the U.S.
State Department, began active work.” (No evidence was provided for
the accusation.) He considers nongovernmental agencies and
civil-society groups like the National Endowment for Democracy, Human
Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the election-monitoring
group Golos to be barely disguised instruments of regime change.
The
U.S. officials who administer the system that Putin sees as such an
existential danger to his own reject his rhetoric as “whataboutism,”
a strategy of false moral equivalences. Benjamin Rhodes, a
deputy national-security adviser under President Obama, is among
those who reject Putin’s logic, but he said, “Putin is not
entirely wrong,” adding that, in the past, “we engaged in regime
change around the world. There is just enough rope for him to hang
us.”*
The
2016 Presidential campaign in the United States was of keen interest
to Putin. He loathed Obama, who had applied economic sanctions
against Putin’s cronies after the annexation of Crimea and the
invasion of eastern Ukraine. (Russian state television derided Obama
as “weak,” “uncivilized,” and a “eunuch.”) Clinton, in
Putin’s view, was worse—the embodiment of the liberal
interventionist strain of U.S. foreign policy, more hawkish than
Obama, and an obstacle to ending sanctions and reëstablishing
Russian geopolitical influence. At the same time, Putin deftly
flattered Trump, who was uncommonly positive in his statements about
Putin’s strength and effectiveness as a leader. As early as 2007,
Trump declared that Putin was “doing a great job in rebuilding the
image of Russia and also rebuilding Russia period.” In 2013, before
visiting Moscow for the Miss Universe pageant, Trump wondered, in a
tweet, if he would meet Putin, and, “if so, will he become my new
best friend?” During the Presidential campaign, Trump delighted in
saying that Putin was a superior leader who had turned the Obama
Administration into a “laughingstock.”
For
those interested in active measures, the digital age presented
opportunities far more alluring than anything available in the era of
Andropov. The Democratic and Republican National Committees offered
what cybersecurity experts call a large “attack surface.” Tied
into politics at the highest level, they were nonetheless unprotected
by the defenses afforded to sensitive government institutions. John
Podesta, the chairman of Hillary Clinton’s campaign and a former
chief of staff of Bill Clinton’s, had every reason to be aware of
the fragile nature of modern communications. As a senior counsellor
in the Obama White House, he was involved in digital policy. Yet even
he had not bothered to use the most elementary sort of defense,
two-step verification, for his e-mail account.
“The
honest answer is that my team and I were over-reliant on the fact
that we were pretty careful about what we click on,” Podesta said.
In this instance, he received a phishing e-mail, ostensibly from “the
Gmail team,” that urged him to “change your password
immediately.” An I.T. person who was asked to verify it mistakenly
replied that it was “a legitimate e-mail.”
The
American political landscape also offered a particularly soft target
for dezinformatsiya, false information intended to
discredit the official version of events, or the very notion of
reliable truth. Americans were more divided along ideological lines
than at any point in two decades, according to the Pew Research
Center. American trust in the mainstream media had fallen to a
historic low. The fractured media environment seemed to spawn
conspiracy theories about everything from Barack Obama’s place of
birth (supposedly Kenya) to the origins of climate change (a Chinese
hoax). Trump, in building his political identity, promoted such
theories.
“Free
societies are often split because people have their own views, and
that’s what former Soviet and current Russian intelligence tries to
take advantage of,” Oleg Kalugin, a former K.G.B. general, who has
lived in the United States since 1995, said. “The goal is to deepen
the splits.” Such a strategy is especially valuable when a country
like Russia, which is considerably weaker than it was at the height
of the Soviet era, is waging a geopolitical struggle with a stronger
entity.
In
early January, two weeks before the Inauguration, James Clapper, the
director of national intelligence, released a declassified report
concluding that Putin had ordered an influence campaign to harm
Clinton’s election prospects, fortify Donald Trump’s, and
“undermine public faith in the U.S. democratic process.” The
declassified report provides more assertion than evidence.
Intelligence officers say that this was necessary to protect their
information-gathering methods.
Critics
of the report have repeatedly noted that intelligence agencies, in
the months before the Iraq War, endorsed faulty assessments
concerning weapons of mass destruction. But the intelligence
community was deeply divided over the actual extent of Iraq’s
weapons development; the question of Russia’s responsibility for
cyberattacks in the 2016 election has produced no such tumult.
Seventeen federal intelligence agencies have agreed that Russia was
responsible for the hacking.
In
testimony before the Senate, Clapper described an unprecedented
Russian effort to interfere in the U.S. electoral process. The
operation involved hacking Democrats’ e-mails, publicizing the
stolen contents through WikiLeaks, and manipulating social media to
spread “fake news” and pro-Trump messages.
At
first, Trump derided the scrutiny of the hacking as a “witch hunt,”
and said that the attacks could have been from anyone—the Russians,
the Chinese, or “somebody sitting on their bed that weighs four
hundred pounds.” In the end, he grudgingly accepted the finding,
but insisted that Russian interference had had “absolutely no
effect on the outcome of the election.” Yevgenia Albats, the author
of “The State Within a State,” a book about the K.G.B., said that
Putin probably didn’t believe he could alter the results of the
election, but, because of his antipathy toward Obama and Clinton, he
did what he could to boost Trump’s cause and undermine America’s
confidence in its political system. Putin was not interested in
keeping the operation covert, Albats said. “He wanted to make it as
public as possible. He wanted his presence to be known,” and to
“show that, no matter what, we can enter your house and do what we
want.”
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